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a b s t r a c t
Vaudenay’s cryptanalysis against Chor–Rivest cryptosystem is applicable when the
parameters, p and h, originally proposed by the authors are used. Nevertheless, if p and h are
both prime integers, then Vaudenay’s attack is not applicable. In thiswork, a choice of these
parameters resistant to the existing cryptanalytic attacks, is presented. The parameters are
determined in a suitable range guaranteeing its security and the computational feasibility
of implementation. Regrettably, the obtained parameters are scarce in practice.
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
As iswell known, the Chor–Rivest cryptosystem [1,2] is a knapsack type cryptosystem, and it is based on the Bose–Chowla
theorem and the arithmetic of the Galois field GF
(
ph
)
. The public key of this cryptosystem is defined as
(
c0, . . . , cp−1, p, h
)
,
where ci = bi + d, d ∈
[
0, ph − 2] play the role of noise, bi = api(i), with pi a permutation of the set {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}, and
ai = logg (t + αi), where GF
(
ph
) = {α0, . . . , αp−1}, g is a generator of GF (ph)∗ and GF (ph) = GF(p)[t], deg(t) = h.
The main known attacks against knapsack cryptosystems is the low density attack. It is proved that if the density of the
knapsack is< 0.94, then the system is insecure [3–8]. However, the density of a Chor–Rivest cryptosystem is usually high. In
fact, for the parameters originally proposed in [1,2], the densities are 1.077, 1.139, 1.278, and 1.280. Hence, the low density
attack does not apply to it.
Another attack was developed by Schnorr and Hörner [9,10]. This cryptanalysis has been partially successful in breaking
Chor–Rivest cryptosystem for a certain percentage of keys in GF
(
10312
)
and GF
(
15116
)
, but remark that such parameters
are still far from those originally proposed.
The first really efficient attack for the parameters originally proposed by the authors (i.e., p ∼= 200, h ∼= 24, in [1,2]) has
been obtained in [11], assuming h has a small factor.
In this work we present prime parameters p and h in a range determined by computational feasibility and the security
of the system. The reason to look for prime parameters p and h is to thwart Vaudenay’s work [11] because for such values
Vaudenay’s attack is not applicable.
2. The range 1044 < n < 1060
As stated above, we search for new parameters p and h, where both are prime integers. So, we analyze the prime values
for p and h such that
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Table 1
Values of the pairs (p, h) verifying the conditions (1)–(4)
p h p h p h p h p h
409 17 2549 13 2593 13 2659 13 2707 13
3323 13 3547 13 4999 13 5059 13 5413 13
5807 13 6247 13 8443 13 9467 13 10169 11
10333 11 10487 13 11083 11 11783 13 11789 11
11927 11 12109 13 12413 11 12119 13 12163 13
12919 11 13033 11 13099 11 13499 11 13687 11
13721 11 13907 11 14081 11 14347 11 14407 13
14537 11 14731 11 14753 11 15277 11 15361 11
15809 11 17183 11 17299 11 17359 11 17389 11
17509 11 18121 11 18353 11 18401 11 18691 13
19433 11 20287 11 21031 11 21061 11 21377 11
22543 11 22963 11 23333 11 23629 11 23633 11
25457 11 25693 11 25763 11 26489 13 28001 11
28027 11 28219 11 28477 11 28537 11 29879 11
30367 11 30649 11 32533 13 33247 11 33829 11
33967 11 35809 11 36013 11 36563 11 37529 11
38431 11 38833 13 39343 13 39953 11 40151 11
40787 11 41057 11 41957 11 42737 11 44389 11
44543 11 45413 11 46447 11 47917 11 48907 11
51239 11 53551 11 55439 11 56897 11 58907 11
62497 11 64033 11 64403 11 65099 11 66821 11
68113 11 68749 11 70199 11 70249 11 70607 11
72379 11 74027 11 74597 11 75181 11 76831 11
77291 11 79133 11 79973 11 83089 11 83423 11
88969 11 89231 11 90971 11 92381 11 92647 11
92723 11 92849 11 95369 11 95393 11 95581 11
97729 11 98869 11 99787 11 100189 11 101411 11
102217 11 104381 11 104953 11 108761 11 111773 11
119233 11 121501 11 124489 11 124699 11 131479 11
135403 11 144481 11 149173 11 152407 11 153911 11
157897 11 159073 11 163901 11 167269 11 167971 11
172849 11 181757 11 183089 11 184211 11 185987 11
192149 11 205391 11 207293 11 209563 11 211039 11
211949 11 213359 11 215801 11 219823 11 221203 11
221411 11 221567 11 229819 11 231131 11 233113 11
(1) h ≤ p,
(2) 11 ≤ h ≤ 31,
(3) 1044 < ph − 1 < 1060,
(4) The smoothness of n = ph−1 is equal to or less than 1013, i.e., the greatest prime factor of ph−1 has at most 13 decimal
digits.
Remark. We should remark on the fact that the items (1), (3) and (4) imply h ≤ 31. Actually, from (3) we deduce
h log p ≤ 60. If h ≥ 41, then p ≤ 29, thus contradicting (1). If h = 37, then p ∈ {37, 41, 43}, but the smoothness of n
for these three cases is much bigger than 1013. In fact, the least one is 1024 and it corresponds to the case p = 43. The cases
h ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7} are not considered in item (2) as they provide too long public keys, violating the requirement of Section 3.
In fact, the least public key bit length is about 3× 108 bits.
We denote by D the set of pairs (p, h) satisfying the conditions (1)–(4) above, the list of which is given in Table 1. The
following properties are obtained:
(a) #D = 175.
(b) If Dh = {p ∈ Z: (p, h) ∈ D}, then D = D11 ∪ D13 ∪ D17, where #D11 = 150, #D13 = 24, and #D17 = 1.
(c) The smallest prime integer p111 ∈ D11 is p111 = 10169, and the greatest one p11150 ∈ D11 is p11150 = 233113. Similarly, we
have p131 = 2549, p1324 = 39343; and p171 = 409.
(d) The number of bits, bji, of the public keys
(
c0, . . . , cp−1, p, h
)
corresponding to the primes p111 , p
11
150, p
13
1 , p
13
24, and p
17
1 , are
as follows:
b111 = 1494861, b131 = 377268, b171 = 60546
b11150 = 45923283, b1324 = 7829277.
In what follows we justify why the items (3) and (4) are needed.
The number of digits for ph−1 proposed originally by Chor and Rivest [2] is 56, 56, 58, and 61, corresponding to the pairs
(197, 24), (211, 24), (35, 24), and (28, 25), respectively. On the other hand, if the number of digits for ph−1 is small enough
L. Hernández Encinas et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 56 (2008) 2883–2886 2885
Table 2
Values of the prime pairs (p, h) verifying 1044 < ph − 1, h ≤ p, and b(p, h) < 70000
p h d s p h d s p h d s p h d s
109 29 60 38 113 29 60 50 127 29 62 41 131 29 62 41
137 29 62 51 139 29 63 33 149 29 64 29 151 29 64 62
157 29 64 20 163 29 65 39 167 29 65 43 173 29 65 18
179 29 66 51 181 29 66 30 191 29 67 34 193 29 67 38
197 29 67 55 199 29 67 20 211 29 68 55 223 29 69 35
227 29 69 51 229 29 69 67 233 29 69 45 239 29 69 94
241 29 70 40 251 29 70 53 257 29 70 32 263 29 71 46
269 29 71 30 271 29 71 25 277 29 71 33 281 29 72 63
283 29 72 69 293 29 72 29 83 31 60 22 89 31 61 53
97 31 62 47 101 31 63 25 103 31 63 38 107 31 63 28
109 31 64 40 113 31 64 44 127 31 66 64 131 31 66 64
137 31 67 32 139 31 67 56 149 31 68 26 151 31 68 60
157 31 69 49 163 31 69 45 167 31 69 40 173 31 70 53
179 31 70 37 181 31 70 41 191 31 71 45 193 31 71 34
199 31 72 49 197 31 72 69 211 31 73 49 223 31 73 56
227 31 74 30 229 31 74 33 233 31 74 45 239 31 74 23
241 31 74 72 251 31 75 63 257 31 75 29 263 31 76 42
269 31 76 30 271 31 76 34 277 31 76 71 41 37 60 49
43 37 61 24 47 37 62 50 53 37 64 43 59 37 66 30
61 37 67 65 67 37 68 46 71 37 69 38 73 37 69 43
79 37 71 41 83 37 72 36 89 37 73 25 97 37 74 72
101 37 75 42 103 37 75 39 107 37 76 71 109 37 76 52
113 37 76 74 127 37 78 60 131 37 79 34 137 37 80 42
139 37 80 61 149 37 81 70 151 37 81 67 157 37 82 36
163 37 82 35 167 37 83 77 173 37 83 40 179 37 84 61
181 37 84 65 191 37 85 57 193 37 85 28 197 37 85 45
199 37 86 68 211 37 86 47 223 37 87 25 227 37 88 56
229 37 88 26 233 37 88 55 239 37 89 60
(in fact p = 103, h = 12, [10]), we know that the algorithm by Schnorr and Hörner breaks the cryptosystem for a significant
number (42%–76%) of public keys chosen at random. Moreover, the greatest value for (p, h) to which the aforementioned
algorithm applies is p = 151, h = 16, [9], but only 10% of public keys are broken for these parameters.
Both cases above are not specially interesting as they are covered by Vaudenay’s attack, but the method of Schnorr and
Hörner can be efficient for prime values of (p, h) within the range studied by such authors, i.e., (103, 12) and (151, 16). In
any case, the number of digits of n in all the cases considered in [9,10] is not greater than 35.
These facts justify the choice of the pairs (p, h) satisfying the conditions (1)–(3) above: Such values of the parameters
lie approximately in the original range proposed by Chor–Rivest, but they are far from the parameters affected by
Schnorr–Hörner cryptanalysis.
Item (4) is included because of computational feasibility. In fact, the running time for computing a discrete logarithm in
GF(ph)∗ is known to be
O
(
r∑
i=1
ei
(
log2 n+√pi
))
group multiplications [12, p. 108], where n = pe11 · · · perr is the prime factorization of the order of the group.
Moreover, a group multiplication in GF(ph)∗ costs O
(
(h− 1)2 (log2 p)2
)
bit operations [13, p. 128] and [14, p. 8]. Hence,
if B denotes the smoothness of n, then the previous formula allows us to estimate the running time of a discrete logarithm
in GF(ph)∗ as
(log2 n)
3
(
log2 n+
√
B
)
log2 B
.
In addition, if we assume that the number of bit operations per day on a standard PC is 1012, then in the range of item
(3), we obtain B < 1013.
3. The key size
The sizes of public keys in the Chor–Rivest cryptosystem are usually much greater than the sizes of those for RSA and
ElGamal PKCs. In fact, for the original parameters proposed in [2], denoting by b(p, h) the bit length of the public keys
corresponding to (p, h), we have
b(197, 24) = 36064, b(211, 24) = 39259,
b(243, 24) = 46426, b(256, 25) = 51470.
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As we have shown in item (d), in the range 1044 < n < 1060 there is a unique pair (p, h) for which the size of its public
key is similar to the greatest one of the four cases above; namely, p = 409, h = 17, for which b(409, 17) = b171 = 60546.
A reasonable bound for the bit length of the public key should be 70000, as this is near to the double of the least bit length
of the original values for (p, h).
We have searched for the prime pairs (p, h) such that 1044 < n, h ≤ p, and the bit length of its corresponding public key
is not greater than 70000. Among these pairs, those not included in the range defined by items (1)–(4), are given in Table 2,
where d (resp. B = 10s) denotes the number of digits (resp. smoothness) of n. The relevant fact is that none of such pairs
has a smoothness ≤ 1013; i.e. the item (4) does not hold. Actually, the least value for the smoothness of such pairs is 1018,
corresponding to p = 173, h = 29.
4. Conclusions
(i) A unique prime pair (p, h) exists in the range (1)–(4) and with a bit length for the public key parameters slightly greater
than those proposed originally in [1,2]; namely, p = 409, h = 17. Moreover, we have that the number of digits of n is 45,
the smoothness is 1010, the bit length of the corresponding public key is b171 = 60546, the density of the cryptosystem
for such parameters is bounded from below by 2.77, and the factorization of n is
n = 40917 − 1 = 23 · 3 · 172 · 103 · 307 · 443 · 3163 · 43283 · 47363 · 55217 · 21906541 · 329083009.
(ii) Although Vaudenay’s cryptanalysis to the Chor–Rivest cryptosystem does not include the case of prime parameters
(p, h), the results above actually show that the cryptosystem is useless nowadays due to the present computational
limitations, which essentially affect the size of the public key and the smoothness of n, because of the complexity of the
discrete logarithm problem.
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